Naturalism by Larvor, B.
Naturalism 
Humanism is a naturalistic worldview.  The British Humanist Association explains on its website that 
humanists believe, “that the universe is a natural phenomenon with no supernatural side.”1  
Naturalism, then, excludes the supernatural.  This much is clear, but when philosophers and 
scientists develop positive versions of naturalism, it divides into many varieties, from a minimal 
rejection of magic through to thoroughgoing scientific physicalism or materialism.  Faced with this 
plurality, the way forward is to examine the root philosophical motivation for naturalism to see what 
it commits us to, and at what cost.   
What is naturalism and why does it matter? 
Naturalism is the view that the sciences of nature are the best (in some versions, the only) guides to 
what there is, what it is like, and why.  Naturalism is sometimes cast as the claim that there is 
nothing supernatural, nothing 'spooky' in the world.  There are, for naturalists, no gods, fairies, 
Platonic forms or immaterial souls.  However, this claim about what there is derives from the claim 
that the natural sciences are our best, perhaps our only sources of knowledge and explanation.  To 
see that this is so, consider the list of things that naturalists regard as spooky and more especially 
the things that do not count as spooky.  There are some very strange and, from a human 
perspective, elusive things in the world, such as sub-atomic particles and radio waves, but these are 
not spooky because physics can detect them, model them mathematically and to some degree 
explain their properties.  If we had telepathic powers, they would be spooky only if they operated in 
a way that left no trace detectable by natural science.  Mobile telephony is not spooky.  Imagine 
creatures that had evolved radio receivers and transmitters as parts of their bodies.  They would be 
telepathic, but this would not be spooky.  The natural sciences have the cultural authority to rule on 
what is or is not spooky just because they enjoy such striking success, compared with other 
discourses, in supplying knowledge and explanations and resolving their internal disputes.  Broadly 
speaking, naturalist epistemology (theory of knowledge) is logically prior to naturalist ontology 
(account of what there is). 
Naturalism exists as an –ism, as a philosophical thesis, because it lives as a tendency, a stance, a cast 
of mind, a constellation of mental habits and reflexes.  This life feeds on the spectacular successes of 
the natural sciences.  No other intellectual enterprise except pure mathematics has such reliable and 
effective means for correcting error and achieving stable results.  Moreover, through the 
technologies that it enables, natural science shapes the life of everyone on Earth.  This gives natural 
scientists an authority beyond the borders of their disciplines.  In public controversy, the principal 
opposition to organised religion seems to come from natural science.  This is not because other 
disciplines are irrelevant or lack arguments.  For example, there is an aesthetic case against the 
established monotheisms.  As bodies of practice that promise to turn the highly contingent joys and 
inevitable sorrows of finite creatures into tales worth telling, the Mosaic monotheisms can be found 
wanting compared to art and literature.   The religious traditions have insight and inspiration to 
offer, but shackled as they are with doctrine and limited to a fixed canon of Holy Scripture, they will 
always lack depth and subtlety compared with the traditions of practice that produced Sophocles 
and Shakespeare, Goya and Beethoven, and the rest of the best of art and literature.  Suspend, for a 
moment, the question of whether an anti-theistic argument of this sort could succeed.  The point to 
note is that it is rarely even explored, in spite of the fact that it reaches the heart of the matter.  
Making sense of human life is the principal business of organised religion, including those varieties of 
religion that take care to avoid conflict with natural science by not saying anything testable about 
the natural world.  One might have expected opponents of organised religion to seek out arguments 
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to show that it is not very good at its main business.  Critics of organised religion rarely deploy 
arguments rooted in literary or art criticism, because aesthetics does not have sufficient cultural 
credibility to carry conviction among the undecided.  This is because aestheticians produce shifting, 
conflicting semi-subjective readings of artworks rather than stable, agreed knowledge. 
To consider another alternative, there is an ethical case against organised religion.  Many atheists 
feel that, far from supplying reasons for behaving decently and a practical specification of what 
decency means, orthodox religions fail to meet our ethical standards.  Ancient religious texts 
encourage attitudes that we now find prejudiced, and for the most part fail to condemn slavery.  
Even those versions of monotheism that have had these unattractive features reformed out of them 
usually retain an insistence on the importance of gratitude and obedience towards God, regardless 
of what God chooses to visit upon us.  This looks, to many humanists, like a failure to appreciate the 
ethical importance of the dignity and autonomy of individual persons.  Uncritical, undiscriminating 
gratitude and obedience seem, from a humanist point of view, like servility.  Besides, to act well for 
the sake of God is to miss the point of ethics, and to misdirect our attention away from the proper 
objects of ethical concern.  When I treat someone well, my principal reason for doing so should be 
something to do with that person—her needs, rights, sensibility or interests, depending on the case.  
I may also have a regard for my own integrity and the good of society.  These are all proper objects 
of my ethical concern, from which thoughts of God can only be a distraction.  This, in outline, is an 
objection to organised religion that (like the aesthetic objection) cuts close to the core of what 
religion and humanism are both about.  Compared with such considerations, the points of dispute 
between some natural sciences and some versions of theism are about as relevant to most people's 
lives as the controversies among physicists over string theory.  Indeed, the ethical shortcomings of 
the established monotheisms are often a motive for becoming a campaigning humanist.  However, 
we live in a culture that is unsure of the status and sources of ethics, so this line of argument too 
seems insufficiently robust for the task of refuting religion in public.   
Historical criticism is another road rarely travelled by campaigning humanists.  The Abrahamic 
religions all make claims about the past, if only about the origins of their scriptures and the lives of 
their founders.  Historians, though they dispute explanations and interpretations, have reliable 
means of establishing some facts about some events in the past.  One might think that here is a solid 
basis for anti-theistic argument.  Indeed, the development in the nineteenth century of rigorous 
critical history was vital to the emergence of the contemporary secular spirit.  However, historical 
argument has features that make it unsuitable for public controversy.  In order to understand a 
historical event, one has to reconstruct in thought the significantly related features of the world in 
which it took place.  Crossing a river may mean nothing—or the river may be the Rubicon and the 
traveller a Roman military commander, in which case this act may have a very specific significance.  
Laying out the background against which an act becomes intelligible tends to be a wordy business.  
Historical theses are responsible to masses of available evidence, in ways that depend on judgments 
about what is significantly related to the events in question and how.  Debates about historical 
theses involve contesting such matters of detail and rarely issue in a clear winner.  Moreover, the 
origins of religions, the lives of their founders and the composition histories of their texts tend to be 
obscure.  It is rarely possible to find independent testimony sufficient to establish beyond dispute 
that this miracle did not happen or that those events did not take place as described.  Usually, 
historical criticism has to be satisfied with indirect arguments such as appeals to: the presence in an 
allegedly new, original faith of elements from previous religious cultures; the historical specificity of 
supposedly universal religions; or the failure of independent contemporary chronicles to mention 
publicly performed miracles.  Such arguments are often sound, but they do not offer killer debating 
points to public polemicists.  In general, historical argument requires too much patience and 
attention to detail for campaigning purposes.  Invited to endorse a simple claim, historians usually 
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say, “It’s actually more complicated than that…”  This is not helpful for campaigning humanists.  
Finally, historians differ in their interpretations of the available evidence in ways that natural 
scientists do not.  More precisely, historians go on disagreeing indefinitely, whereas disputes in 
natural science usually reach a conclusion.  Historians do not have reliable means for resolving their 
larger disagreements and hence find themselves unfairly tossed into the same box as art critics and 
ethicists—the box labelled ‘it’s all a matter of opinion’. 
Thus, in spite of the fact that there are promising aesthetic, ethical and historical arguments that 
strike against the core narratives and claims of the main organised religions, public opinion regards 
natural science as the effective opposition to organised religion.  Natural science alone has the 
authority to offer an account of reality so powerful and comprehensive that it may leave no room for 
alternatives—or at least, it sets conditions on what alternatives there may be.2  Naturalism is the 
name this conviction takes when it crystallises as doctrine.  As Wilfred Sellars put it, “Science is the 
measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.”3 
Is Naturalism true?  
We have seen that naturalism has two aspects: it makes claims about what there is (or rather, what 
there is not: it says that there is nothing ‘spooky’) and it makes claims about knowledge and 
explanation.  Here I shall consider the ontological aspect (the part about what there is not) first, so 
that we can see what is at stake when we come to the second, epistemological aspect. 
Naturalist Ontology 
Many things are invisible to natural science.  Money, for example, is real.  A person’s level of wealth 
or indebtedness is a matter of fact no less than his or her weight.  Natural science can detect 
physical tokens and the electronic recordings in banks’ computers, but it cannot recognise these as 
money.  This is particularly obvious in the case of obsolete currencies.  On 1 January 2002, my small 
pile of French francs and centimes ceased to be money, but there was no physical alteration in these 
tokens, nor was there any event that natural science could identify as the cause of my old French 
coins ceasing to be money, because the relevant concepts are social and political, not natural.  
Naturalist inclinations might tempt us to say that money is merely social or political, but this is a 
temptation we should resist.  Anyone who seriously doubts the reality of money should try telling 
creditors that money is merely a social construction.   
Music is another reality that escapes natural scientific scrutiny.  Physics can detect sound waves, and 
neurologists can study the effect of music on brains, but there is no way for natural science to 
distinguish between music and other kinds of sound.  In some avant garde contexts, the sound of a 
helicopter can be music, and many musical performances include silences.  We need not consider 
the extreme case of a performance that consists entirely of silence—any piece of music that includes 
a rest between one phrase and another will make the point.  If the music of which a rest is a part is 
in common time and C-major, then it is not absurd to say that the silent rest is in the same rhythm 
and key.  Natural science has no hope of distinguishing a musical silence from a non-musical one, 
because ‘music’ is a cultural category, not a natural one.   
Still, one might say, money and music are not spooky.  They exist in space and time.  For money to 
exist, there must be physical tokens (coins, electronic records or perhaps, in an alien species 
incapable of forgetfulness or deceit, brain-states), there must be some society of physically 
embodied people who use these tokens as money, and there must be physically-mediated 
communication among these people.   We make music by beating, scraping or blowing—all physical 
actions.  The relevant philosophical technical concept here is supervenience.  One domain (say, 
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money) supervenes on another (say, physics) if, for every change that takes place in the first, there is 
a corresponding change in the second.  If I pay a restaurant bill (which is an alteration in the domain 
of money), there is a corresponding physical change—it could be a movement of notes and coin 
from my pocket to the cash-register, or it could be alterations to the electronic records of the 
relevant banks.  Any change in the world of money has a corresponding change in the world of 
physical nature—or to use the technical term, money supervenes on physical nature.  Philosophers 
put it this way in order to avoid suggesting that there is some regular pattern between these two 
domains.  Given a purely financial description of a financial event—say, that I paid my restaurant 
bill—you could not identify the molecules that participated in the corresponding physical event 
(though you could guess that molecules in my brain probably did play a role, and confidently identify 
some that were not involved, such as the molecules in distant stars).  Physical nature does not 
supervene on money, because there can be physical changes without corresponding financial 
changes.  Notice that the supervenience relation between the corresponding physical and financial 
events is not like the causal relation between temporally discrete events.  Suppose that two 
astronomers have a bet on the date of an expected supernova.  Shortly after they observe the 
supernova, one astronomer passes a banknote to the other.  The supernova causes a financial 
transaction, but the financial event does not supervene on it (rather it supervenes on the movement 
of the banknote).   One way of thinking about the supervenience relation is to say that the financial 
event (paying a bill) and the corresponding physical event (changes in electronic potential in bank’s 
computers) are the same event, but differently described.  Not all philosophers accept this.   
Similarly, music supervenes on physical nature.  For every musical event, there is a corresponding 
physical event.  This normally includes a propagation of sound waves, but it could be the brain 
activity of a musician silently reading a score, or that of a composer who inwardly hears the solution 
to a musical riddle.  Thus, although music and money are invisible to natural science, they depend on 
(supervene on) things that the natural sciences can detect.  This dependency suggests that the 
objects of natural science are somehow more basic or more real than music and money.  I shall 
return to this in a moment.  First, here are some other examples of things that escape detection by 
the natural sciences.   
Arguments are essential to the practice of science.  We are obliged to believe the conclusion of a 
scientific enquiry only insofar as there is a good-quality argument that takes us from the data that 
the argument relies on to the conclusion of the enquiry.  The standard account in philosophy of logic 
is that a good-quality argument is one with the right kind of logical relations between the 
propositions that make up its premises and the proposition that is its conclusion.  An argument is a 
relation between propositions.  It helps at this point to appreciate some standard distinctions 
between propositions, sentences and statements.  A statement is a datable event at a specific 
location—as in, “the lawyer made a statement on the steps of the court at 3.30 today.”  Sentences 
differ from statements in that they are not spatially and temporally specific.  British prime ministers 
reply to some questions in Parliament with the sentence, “I refer the honourable gentleman to the 
statement I made some moments ago.”— it is always the very same sentence, even though the PM 
says it many times.  So a sentence is more abstract than a statement.  However, a sentence is a 
specific chain of words.  A proposition is not.  One could express the same proposition by different 
sentences in the same language (‘Paul is taller than John’ and ‘John is shorter than Paul’ express the 
same proposition) or by sentences in different languages.  Propositions are thus more abstract than 
sentences and not easily detectable (as such) by natural science.  But remember, we are interested 
in arguments.  An argument consists of logically related propositions.  So if we want to detect 
arguments, we have to detect not only propositions but also the logical relations between them.  
Natural science cannot do this directly.  In order for natural science to detect logical relations even 
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indirectly, we would have to discover a law-like connection between logical relations and something 
that natural science can detect.  There are no plausible candidates for this ‘something’.  
This matters because natural science is a great collection of arguments.  So although arguments, and 
the distinction of quality between the ones we ought to believe and the others, are invisible to 
natural science, they are an inescapable part of the world of anyone who practices natural science.  
Therefore, they are an inescapable part of the world of anyone who wishes to take natural science 
as the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.  Of course, making 
arguments involves objects and processes that natural science can detect (ink on paper, sound-
waves, changes in electronic records, etc.).  Argument-making supervenes on physics in something 
like the way that music does.  But it does not follow from this that arguments themselves supervene 
on physics.  It is not uncommon for the same argument to turn up independently in different times 
and places, because people living in societies separated in space and time nevertheless inhabit the 
same planet and belong to the same species, and consequently face many of the same problems and 
questions.  Suppose that some priest X thought of an argument in Persia in 600BC, but that 
argument was later forgotten and all records of it destroyed.  Now suppose that Celtic monk Y 
rediscovered it in 600AD.  It seems that to speak of a rediscovery, we have to accord this argument a 
kind of existence that is independent of any physical expression or record.  In other words, 
arguments are spooky.  Either that, or we have to find an interpretation of the grammar of 
sentences about the rediscovery of arguments that shows how they are not (in spite of appearances) 
talking about a single item, the argument, which was found, then lost, then found again as if it were 
a physical object.  This is not impossible, but such a re-reading of ordinary English grammar would 
have to have some independent motivation, aside from satisfying the naturalist inclinations of the 
re-reader.  In any case, arguments are not the only abstract objects that science seems to need.  
What are naturalists to say about mathematics?  One tempting line is to say that when 
mathematicians seem to talk about mathematical objects, they are really talking indirectly about 
spatial-temporal objects.  On this view, theorems about numbers are really facts about collections of 
things, and theorems in geometry are really facts about physical space, or perhaps space-time, or 
perhaps a model of space-time.  The trouble with this line is that much of pure mathematics is about 
objects that have no spatial-temporal correlates.  For example, in solid geometry, there are just five 
regular polyhedra (the tetrahedron, octahedron, cube, dodecahedron and icosahedron—the 
‘Platonic’ solids).  Perhaps we could think of this result as a fact about physical space (or a certain 
useful model of it).  However, we can ask the same question (how many regular shapes?) about 
spaces with more than three dimensions.  There are objects like regular polyhedra in higher 
dimensions (they are called ‘convex regular polytopes’).  In the case of four dimensions, there are 
precisely six convex regular polytopes.  In all dimensions higher than four, there are just three 
convex regular polytopes.   This result is not about physical space or spatial-temporal objects.  There 
is nothing physical or spatial-temporal that these theorems are ‘really’ about.  Convex regular 
polytopes in higher dimensions do not supervene on anything physical (they do not change, so the 
definition of supervenience does not apply to them).  There is no prospect of translating facts about 
them into facts about things that natural science can detect.  They leave no physical trace.  They 
seem spooky.  Nevertheless, natural science depends on some highly abstract mathematics.   
For all this, one may feel that the objects studied by the natural sciences are really real in a way that 
these other things are not.  After all, as we noted, many of the items that are undetectable by 
natural science nevertheless supervene on objects and processes that natural science can detect.  So 
what does ‘real’ mean?  How can we judge which objects are really real?  There are some reality-
tests we can apply to things that we suspect may or may not be real.  One is resistance to my will: 
something is real if I cannot change it just by wishing—fantasies fail this test, but money, music, 
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arguments and mathematical objects all pass it.  Certainly, I can change the first two if I work on 
them, but this is also true of physical objects.  On this test, abstract objects are more real than 
physical objects.  Another reality-test is independence of my consciousness—dreams fail this.  But 
our four non-natural objects do quite well on this test.  For example, our financial condition does not 
change when we fall asleep.  A third reality-test is that a real object should have more than one 
mode of presentation (for example, some philosophers4 have argued that the shape of a physical 
object is an objective feature because you can feel it and see it, touch and sight being two modes of 
presentation).  This is true of some of the most important mathematical constants—you can think of 
π as the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, or you can define it in terms of power 
series that seem to have nothing to do with circles.  There are many ways of calculating a person’s 
wealth, and you can hear music, feel it through the floor, or read it from a score.   
There is another class of items, rather less abstract than the objects of pure mathematics, which also 
seem to fall outside the scope of the natural sciences.  These are our empirical perceptions, our 
experiences of colour, sound, balance, movement and so on.  These do seem to supervene on 
physical events (for every change in perception, there must be a change in the perceiver’s brain).  
However, perceptions are problematic for naturalism because their spatial locations are hard to pin 
down.  Is the redness of a red ball in the ball or in the eye of the beholder?  Is the pain of my sore 
toe in my toe or in my brain?  This question about location is pressing so long as we insist, on 
naturalist grounds, that everything must have a spatial-temporal location.  But we know that this is 
not true of some things.  Suppose the bank takes my savings, combines them with the savings of 
other depositors and lends this aggregate to several different borrowers.  Where is my money?  It is 
not in the bank, because the bank loaned it to someone else.  But because the bank aggregated my 
money with that of other savers, we cannot track it to this or that borrower.  My money is in no 
place.  Nevertheless, in spite of being nowhere, my money exists, and there is nothing spooky about 
it.  Perhaps perceptions, numbers and arguments are also nowhere.   
Professional naturalist philosophers do not stand helpless before these considerations.  There are 
long-running philosophical research-programmes aimed at making all these objects and phenomena 
safe for naturalism.  Naturalist philosophers of mind can offer reasons to hope that neurology will 
one day explain everything about our perceptual experience.  Naturalist philosophers of 
mathematics have a range of options: they can insist that mathematics is a collection of conditional 
truths (if there were things of this sort then they would necessarily have these properties), or they 
can argue that mathematics does not really have objects, or that the objects of mathematics are 
useful fictions (other options are available too).  Naturalist philosophers of logic and language have 
elaborated interpretations of the central logical terms like ‘proposition’, ‘argument’ and ‘valid’ that 
make no reference to abstracta.  Naturalist philosophers can insist that music and money are 
complex systems of meanings, conventions and intentions, and that these are all ultimately states of 
the brains of the people who participate in these institutions, and would be captured and explained 
by a comprehensive knowledge of those brain-states, were such knowledge possible.   
This is not the moment to evaluate these efforts, but merely to note that they are strenuous.  
Showing that mathematics can do without mathematical objects, for example, requires an enormous 
technical labour.  Naturalists face an especially difficult task with normativity (the question of what 
we ought to do).  I said earlier that we ought to be convinced by good arguments, and that we 
cannot understand the practice of science without recognising this.  Where in the-world-as-
described-by-natural-science is that ‘ought’ to be found?  The leading naturalist reply is to make this 
ought into a conditional imperative.5  It says: if you are trying to understand the natural world, then 
the most efficient strategy is to do it like this.  However, this reply seems insufficient.  If someone 
shows me a good argument, I ought to find it rationally compelling, regardless of my aims.  In the 
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philosophy of mind, defending naturalism entails claiming that if we knew all the natural facts, we 
would know everything.  For example, a naturalist might claim that if we knew all the natural facts 
about all the brains of all the musicians in the world (and any other relevant natural facts, for 
example about sound and the instruments we use to make it), then we would know everything 
about music.  The antecedent of this if-then statement can never be true; we can never know all the 
natural facts about all the brains of all the musicians in the world.  For reasons of this sort, naturalist 
philosophy of mind depends on thought- experiments that are often counter-intuitive and difficult to 
think about.  Arguing for naturalism is strenuous—it strains the philosophical imagination and it is 
not outrageous to suggest that at times it strains credibility.  All I want to claim here is that 
naturalism as a claim about what there is in the world is not an obvious, unproblematic truth that 
only a person corrupted by superstition or religion could dispute.  On the contrary, naturalism is far 
from obvious and full of unsolved problems, in spite of the best efforts of thousands of professional 
philosophers. 
So far, in this section, I have discussed naturalism as a claim about what there is.  However, as I 
suggested at the outset, naturalist ontology gains its credibility from the epistemological and 
explanatory successes of natural science.  This point is, I hope, more obvious now that we have 
sketched the extensive and arduous tasks that lie before philosophers who wish to insist on 
naturalist ontology.  The professional philosophers who undertake the job of vindicating naturalist 
ontology find their motivation in the epistemological and explanatory successes of the natural 
sciences.  The worldview that naturalist philosophers draw from the natural sciences may face all 
sorts of difficulties and objections, but, the naturalists think, something like it must be true because 
the natural sciences enjoy such prodigious success and enable the manufacture of such 
extraordinary technologies.  This tension is one of the central drivers of contemporary philosophy.  
On one hand, the successes of natural science suggest that some version of naturalism must be true.  
On the other hand, reconciling naturalism with everything else that we know is very difficult.  It is 
time to examine the other aspect of naturalism, that is, its epistemology.   
Naturalist Epistemology 
No-one seriously disputes that the natural sciences are successful in finding knowledge of and 
explanations for natural phenomena.  But are the natural sciences the only sources of knowledge 
and explanation worthy of the name?  One of the most serious challenges to this view comes from 
the discipline of history.  (In fact, I think it is the most serious challenge, for reasons explained 
below.)  Historians do seem to gain knowledge, understanding and explanations of events in the past 
by thinking rigorously about the evidence available to them now, in the present.  A naturalist who 
thinks that natural scientific knowledge is the only sort of knowledge available must say that insofar 
as historians do know and explain, they do so using some version of the methods of the natural 
sciences, and that the explanations they offer work the same way as explanations in natural science.  
This claim takes some arguing because it requires us to (1) understand the underlying logic (in the 
broad, methodological sense of ‘logic’) of explanations in the natural sciences, (2) understand the 
underlying logic of explanations in history, and (3) compare them to show that they are, at bottom, 
the same.  This is a tall order.  Task (1) assumes that all the natural sciences have the same 
underlying logic6, and task (2) assumes that all historical explanations have the same underlying 
logic.  This is not obvious, because not all natural scientists work the same way, and not all historians 
work the same way.  However, setting these variations within the two camps aside for a moment, 
there do seem to be some deep differences between the way the natural scientists and historians 
pursue their investigations.   
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One difference is that historians understand events by setting them in historical context.  For 
example, Martin Luther nailed his convictions to the Wittenburg church door.  Our understanding of 
this deed shifts when we learn that this was the normal way of publishing academic theses in 
advance of a public debate, and deepens a little further on learning that the church in question 
housed a large and profitable collection of holy relics.  Deeper understanding still would come from 
further contextualisation.  In the natural sciences, it is not usually necessary to contextualise events 
in order to understand them (though it may be necessary to say something about the environment 
in which they take place—for example, the temperature).  The difference between environment and 
context is that environmental factors such as temperature can only make a difference causally.  
Context does not work this way.  Perhaps the relics in the Wittenburg church made no causal 
difference to Luther’s nailing up of his theses, but they change the nature of his act nevertheless.  
When two particles collide, physicists can understand the collision without needing to know when 
and where they collided, whether this collision was planned or accidental, or whether the particles 
have collided previously.  When two people meet, the nature (and in some cases, the legality) of the 
meeting may depend on whether it was a chance encounter or a rendezvous, and whether this was 
the first time they had met.  The place and time of the meeting may be important.  There is a 
photograph taken in 2007 of the northern Irish politicians Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness 
sharing a joke in public.  It is possible that they had laughed long and hard together in private before 
then, but if they did, their private laughter had none of the significance of that one public moment 
of mirth.  The distinction between private and public contexts does not apply to particles.   
Another difference is that the objects of historical enquiry, that is, human beings, have memories 
and purposes.  In order to understand what people did, we have to consider what it was they were 
trying to do, and the experiences and beliefs that informed these efforts.  This is obvious in the sort 
of narrative history that considers the actions of individuals.  But human purposes play a role even in 
the sort of long-duration history that looks for structural explanations for the rise and fall of entire 
societies over centuries.  Histories of this sort may not consider the beliefs and motives of 
individuals but they must invoke shared ideologies, group memories and collective purposes.   
A third difference, that the first two go some way toward explaining, is that, as Galileo put it, the 
book of nature is written in the language of mathematics.7  Measurement and mathematical 
modelling do play roles in history, but they are not the exclusive language of history as they are in 
most of the natural sciences.  One might, for example, use a mathematical model to show that a 
particular society was in economic decline, but one could not understand what was happening 
without knowing something about the religious outlook and ideological orientation of the society.  
There are many different ways of responding to an economic decline—denial, change of economic 
policy, invasion of neighbouring territories, intensification of religious devotions and so on.  A society 
that believes that misfortune is invariably a divine punishment may respond differently from a 
society that associates wealth with military valour, and economic models do not capture such 
differences.  When the price of bread rises, people may respond with textbook economic behaviour 
such as switching to potatoes or importing more grain—or they may riot.  What they do will depend 
in part on their beliefs about themselves and the world they live in, for example, they may have an 
understanding of kingship that makes some courses of action impossible.  The prospect of 
developing a general formal model of political authority that would be of any use at all in explaining 
specific events is remote.  (To get a sense of how deeply ideological and religious convictions can 
structure behaviour, consider the pharaohs of ancient Egypt.  For centuries, they worked very hard 
to protect their mummified corpses from thieves and developed all manner of ingenious strategies, 
but, for ideological and religious reasons, they never considered the simple option of not being 
buried with an immense hoard of treasure.)  Contexts, purposes and memories are specific to times, 
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places and people.  In the natural sciences, in contrast, general mathematical models are powerful 
precisely because they abstract from particular details.   
It is plausible that these differences mark the study of human history as a different sort of enquiry 
from the natural sciences, with radically different, methods and modes of argument because they 
have radically subject-matter.  To make this vivid, consider the very different course that 
disagreements take in history from the way that natural scientists attempt to resolve controversies.  
If this is right, then the natural sciences are not the only sources of knowledge and explanations 
worthy of the name.  In other words, if historical knowledge and explanation is not a branch of 
natural science, then naturalism is false.  This point is especially sharp, because naturalists find 
themselves obliged to make historical arguments.  To see why that is, it is worth considering the 
mildest form of naturalism: methodological naturalism.   
Methodological naturalism is the approach to the study of nature that treats the world as if it had 
nothing in it but spatial-temporal objects and their natural properties and as if all causes were 
natural causes.  It is the minimal requirement for natural scientists.  When natural scientists seek the 
cause of an event, they have to look for natural causes, even if there does not seem to be one or if a 
non-natural explanation makes more sense.  If someone recovers from a disease for no obvious 
reason, scientists cannot declare a miracle (even if they personally believe in miracles).  
Methodological naturalism requires them to say that the patient recovered as a result of some 
unknown natural process.  If a person chooses an apple rather than a cake, non-scientists might be 
satisfied with the explanation that this person has the aim of losing some weight, and natural 
scientists might be satisfied with this too, outside their scientific work.  But a natural scientific 
explanation of this decision must cite only natural causes, such as brain chemistry and evolutionary 
pressures (aims are not natural causes).  The great advantage of methodological naturalism is that it 
leaves open the question of whether full-strength, unconditional naturalism is true.  It allows most 
varieties of atheist and religious believer to work together as scientists.  As long as everyone in the 
laboratory is intent on seeking natural explanations for phenomena, it may not matter that they 
disagree about whether these are the only kind of explanation possible.  They can agree that from 
the point of view of natural science there are no non-natural objects, processes or properties.  They 
need not, for day-to-day scientific purposes, broach the question of whether the point of view of 
natural science is the only properly objective or informative perspective.  
Full-strength naturalists, of course, are not satisfied with merely methodological (as-if) naturalism.  
They insist that the sciences that proceed on naturalist assumptions are successful because those 
assumptions are true.  When pressed, however, they run the risk of arguing in a circle.  If the natural 
sciences assume methodological naturalism as a premise, it is hardly surprising or impressive when 
they conclude that the world has nothing but natural objects, properties and causes in it.  The 
dramatic successes of the natural sciences and the technologies they enable do suggest very strongly 
that the natural world is much as the natural sciences describe it, but this does not establish 
naturalism.  Non-naturalists who think that there are other aspects to reality aside from those 
revealed by the natural sciences need not (and ought not) deny that the natural sciences get nature 
right.  It is quite possible to recognise the successes of the natural sciences while insisting that there 
are non-natural domains, which might include culture, the economy, ethics, mathematics, logic, 
spirituality or religion.  On this sort of view, the discourse that explains how sound waves propagate 
is simply disjoint from the discourse that seeks to understand what it is about the music of WA 
Mozart that makes it on the whole better than the music that his father wrote.  Theists (other than 
scriptural literalists) can agree that the natural world operates according to laws that we can 
formulate mathematically and discover experimentally, and add that, from a religious point of view, 
it is suffused with love and mercy.  Platonists can agree with the results of natural science and add 
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that only their commitment to really existing abstracta can explain how such sciences are possible.  
And so on.  Methodological naturalism is compatible with all manner of non-naturalist metaphysics.  
Therefore, full-strength, unconditional naturalists have to make an argument.  
There is an argument available to full-strength naturalists that tells against the major religious non-
naturalist worldviews.  It is this: these worldviews have been tried and found wanting.  
Methodological naturalism did not spring from nowhere.  It is the product of a centuries-long 
process that began in societies that saw the world (including the aspects of the world that we now 
think of as nature) in religious terms.  The shift away from the mental habit of understanding natural 
phenomena in terms of divine purpose did not happen quickly, nor was it the result of a single 
innovation.  The earliest Greek philosopher that we know of, Thales of Miletus, is said to have 
claimed that “Everything is full of gods”—that is, change and movement in nature are explained as 
the activity of myriad purposeful agents.  In this, Thales seems to have intellectualised the popular 
religion of his day.  Even a phlegmatic and worldly thinker such as Aristotle thought that everything 
has a telos, that is, a purpose or direction.  Spin forward to the end of the thirteenth century.  When 
the Dominican monk Theodoric of Freiburg wrote on the nature of rainbows, he combined the 
biblical account (that the rainbow is a sign of God’s covenant with man) with geometrical analyses of 
the incidence of sunlight on raindrops.  (Theodoric seems to have been an early experimentalist, 
using glass globes to model raindrops.)  As the centuries advanced and the physico-mathematical 
explanations became more sophisticated, the role of divine purpose receded and became vague.  
Leibniz was sure that everything happens as part of the divine plan, but saw no point in trying to 
associate particular natural phenomena with particular divine purposes.  The last flicker of animism 
in natural science was vitalism (the view that living matter contains some non-physical vital spark or 
is somehow essentially different from non-living matter), and this finally died out in the early years 
of the twentieth century.    
There are many different versions of the story of the emergence of natural science from natural 
philosophy, magic, speculation and myth.8  The central point is this: it is a story of progress.  
Naturalists can point out that religious views of the natural world have fallen out of favour because 
they lost a fair contest.  In other words, naturalism may be among the methodological assumptions 
of any individual piece of current work in natural science.  However, it is also the conclusion of a 
historical argument that does not assume naturalism.  On the contrary, the history of science starts 
from radically non-naturalist beginnings, and reveals naturalism to be the outcome of the best 
efforts of serious-minded people to understand the world.  Many of the great scientists of the past 
were religious, but this shows that the historical contest was a fair test (or if it was unfair, the bias 
was against naturalism, which won anyway).   
The price that naturalists pay for this argument is that they have to recognise historical explanation 
as explanation worthy of the name.  We can understand the process that drove divine (spooky) 
purposes out of our understanding of nature only by reconstructing and contextualising the aims 
and arguments of generations of scientists.  The hard and pure naturalism that insists that natural 
science offers the only genuine explanations, and that historical explanations are not real 
explanations, cannot win this argument.  The most it can do is to offer a promissory note to the 
effect that on some unspecified future date it will successfully rewrite historical explanations as 
natural scientific explanations.  There is no reason why anyone should take such a bill, underwritten 
as it is by little more than the philosophical intuitions of convinced naturalists.  It is also worth noting 
that the argument from the history of science works only against the (specifically religious) forms of 
non-naturalism that lost their historical contest with natural science.  It may leave other non-
naturalisms untouched.   
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In short, the serious opposition to full-strength naturalism does not come from religion.  Religious 
non-naturalists insist that there is a dimension of divinity in addition to the aspects of the world that 
natural science explores, but they struggle to show it to anyone who does not already see it.  
Philosophical non-naturalists have good grounds for doubting that naturalists can deliver on their 
promises but struggle to offer persuasive arguments for their own positions.  Rather, the most 
serious opposition to naturalism comes from the discipline of history.  The best argument for the 
superiority of the scientific worldview over its rivals is the history of its rise to dominance—but this is 
a historical argument.  It offers properly historical explanations that appeal to semantic, cultural and 
logical patterns as well as purely physical causes.  It therefore presents a counterexample to the 
claim that natural science is the only source of knowledge and explanations worthy of the name. 
What is spooky? 
For the sake of argument, suppose that the debates mentioned here turn out badly for full-strength 
naturalism.  Suppose, that is, that the best account of the logic of historical explanation shows it to 
be fundamentally different from the logic of natural science; that the best philosophies of logic and 
mathematics posit arguments and mathematical objects that do not reduce to anything spatial-
temporal; that the best philosophy of perception sets our sensory experiences outside the purview 
of natural science; that the best philosophical accounts of money, music and normativity are non-
reductive and radically non-naturalist.  Where would this leave humanism? 
The world we imagine by supposing that all these debates go against full-strength naturalism would 
contain some abstract items that naturalists might regard as spooky, but it would not contain 
anything supernatural.  Rigorous history may operate with concepts (such as ‘purpose’) and methods 
(such as contextualisation) that are foreign to natural science, but it shares the basic requirement 
that explanations must be subject to critical scrutiny and must offer rational  grounds that fit with 
already established knowledge.  Reference to supernatural causes fails this requirement, and the 
critical historian sets them aside as firmly as the natural scientist.  Music, money and perception may 
not reduce to natural categories but they do supervene on physical processes.  Even if abstract 
objects such as arguments and mathematical structures exist somehow independently of the spatial-
temporal realm of natural science, they do not have any magical causal powers.  Arguments are only 
ever causally effective when people speak them, write them or otherwise perform them (and even 
then, their effects are often only loosely related to their content).  Mathematical structures only 
make a difference when people represent them in diagrams or notation (or in special cases, in 
thought) and then manipulate the representations.  We live in a ‘disenchanted’, that is, magic-free 
world, not just because scientists and historians say so, but because our society runs on effective, 
efficient natural causality.  When a car fails to start, we may mutter ‘gremlins’, but our serious, 
earnest efforts are directed towards finding and fixing the mechanical fault.  Attempts to re-enchant 
the world, either with epic art (Wagner, Tolkien) or pointedly pre-modern religious movements 
(neo-paganism, religious fundamentalisms), fail because we understand too much about the world 
and our place in it.9   
In other words, it is perfectly possible to recognise that meaningful human activity creates or refers 
to objects and domains beyond the reach of natural science without suggesting that there are 
purposes and meanings at work in the world other than those present in the activities of naturally 
evolved creatures like us.  Indeed, much of what matters most to humans and to humanism is 
invisible from the perspective of natural science.  When theistic believers challenge atheists to 
explain the source of their morality, they often do so by representing the world as viewed from the 
natural scientific perspective (the ‘view from nowhere’) and observing, correctly, that from that 
angle, there is no morality visible.  The best humanist reply to this is to deny that the natural 
scientific perspective is the only one available.  The point of ethical action is visible, vividly so, from 
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within the dense web of practices, memories and ideas that we inhabit.10  The serious, meaningful 
contrast to ‘natural’ is not ‘supernatural’.  It is ‘cultural’.   
The essentials of humanism have two aspects: a rejection of magical views of the universe in favour 
of some sort of naturalism, and a rejection of nihilism.  The first aspect is relatively easy—the history 
and current successes of the natural sciences make an irresistible case for it.  The subtle part, for 
humanists, is to establish a naturalism that is compatible with the anti-nihilist aspect. 
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Sophist 263b). 
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